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Korean and Vietnam Wars Stot only were denied early, unconditional repatriation, but were denied their retained status. Moreover, even were an enemy to permit
unconditional repatriation, a very good case could be made for denial of its application to U.S. Army medical personnel, inasmuch as under the U.S. Army's new
policy those personscould return to combatant rather than medical duties. Hence the "retained status" relinquished by MSC officers, AMEDD noncommissioned
officers, and other medical personnel who must surrender their DD Form 1934 medical identification card because they do not meet the "exclusively engaged"
criteria of article 24 exists more in appearance than fact. However, in order to~protect those medical personnel who do meet the stricter criteria of article 24, GWS,
MSC officers, AMEDD'noncommissioned officers, and other medical personnel not meeting the "exclusively engaged" criteria of article 24, GWS, must exchange
their medical personnel identification card (DD Form 1934) for the standard DD Form 2A military identification card.
10. A question remains as to when a MSC officer, AMPDD noncommissioned officer, or other medical personnel shifts from the article 24 medical personnel status
to that of article 25 personnel, and the duration of that change. The GWS and Commentary are silent on this matter. The description of duties contained in
paragraph 2 of this memorandum suggests that certain billets have been identified as those in which MSC officers, AMEDD noncommissioned -officers, and other
medical personnel may be called upon to perform nonmedical duties. If they have not been identified, it is incumbent upon the Office of the Surgeon General to
identify them and provide for the relinquishment of the DD Form 1934 by the officer or noncommissioned officer upon assumption of that position.
11. There exists no requirement for such relinquishment to be for the duration of a conflict. A nurse in a foreign army serving as an ammunition bearer (who, at
best, would be entitled to article 25 protection) hypothetically could be reassigned to a field or rear area hospital, at which time he or she would meet the
"exclusively engaged" criteria of article 24. The same is true for MSC officers, AMEDD noncommissioned officers, or other medical, personnel. An officer or
noncommissioned officer serving in a billet that might require him or her to perform nonmedical duties (who, at best, would be entitled to article 25 protection)
could reassume full medical personnel status upon reassignment to a position in which he or she meets the "exclusively engaged" criteria of article 24, GWS.
12. With respect to a helicopter pilot who alternates flying medical evacuation missions and conventional combat missions, such an individual is not entitled to.
medical personnel status nor authorized to carry the DD Form 1934 medical identification card; he may not shift from carrying one identification card to another
depending on the day's mission(s). The same is true with respect to reassignment, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Reassignment must be in the ommqn,
usage sense of the word, i.e., semipermanent, and not a revolving door through which an individual passes depending on his or her duties on a particular da'7_ Either,,
practice would be inconsistent with the "exclusively engaged" criteria of article 24, and could place legitimate'medical personnel at undue risk. CA ,
13. Conclusion, It is recommended that those billets be identified in which MSC officers, AMEDD noncommissioned officers, or other medical itersennel ",dld ot
be "exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, fbr actilig as] staff'
exclusively engaged in the administration 'of medical units and establishments" so that individuals serving in such billets may exchange their DD Form 1934,
identification card for the DD Form 2A card for the paeriod in which they are so serving. This office is prepared to offer additional advice and assistance as required
in accomplishment of this.
14. This memorandum has been coordinated with the International Law Offices of The Judge Advocates General of the Navy and Air Force, who concur with its
contents and conclusion.
FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:
W: Hays Parks
Special Assistant for Law of War
Matters
Letting Life Run Its Course: Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders and
Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment
Lieutenant Colonel William A. Woodruff
Senior Instructor, Administrative and Civil Law Division, TJAGSA
Introduction to painful stimuli. Over the next several weeks shedeveloped a "sleep-wake" cycle and reacted to painful
As medical technology progressed to the point that a stimuli, but remained respirator dependent and in a
patient's vital 'signs could be sustained almost indefi- coma. Her physicians characterized her condition as a
nitely, society began to question the value of these "chronic persistent vegetative state" with'no real hope
advancements. If the patient was permanently comatose, of return to a cognitive condition.
unable to interact with the environment, unable to
communicate with others, unable to feel and appreciate Several months later, after Karen's doctors refused to
the soft touch of a loved one's hand, and unable to discontinue the respirator because they thought to do sofunction at even a basic cognitive level, what purpose would violate accepted standards of medical practice,
was served by keeping the patient "alive"? Joseph Quinlan, Karen's father, petitioned the NewJersey Superior Court for appointment as Karen's guard-
These questions 'and the apparent conflict between ian and asked the court for permission to disconnect the
scientific advances and the essence of human life were respirator. The Superior Court denied the petition. 2 In a
brought into sharper focus on April 15, 1975, when an landmark decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
emergency rescue team was summoned to help Karen reversed, and held that Karen Ann Quinlan's privacy
Ann Quinlan, a 20-year-old woman who had stopped rights under both the state and federal constitutions
breathing for two 15-minute periods. Upon arrival at the outweighed the state's interest in preserving life and,
hospital, Karen had a temperature of 100 degrees, her because she was incompetent, her father could exercise
pupils were unreactive to light, and she was unresponsive that right for her. I The court also held that once the
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2 In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
3 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
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treating physicians determined, and the hospital ethics 'physicians of their desires should they be in a terminal
committee agreed, that there was no reasonable hope of condition and/or comatose and incompetent to decide
Karen emerging from ; her comatose condition to a what medical treatment to accept or reject. 6 In spite of
cognitive state, the respirator could be withdrai'n with- the legislative activity, the'courts have been increasingly
out fear of any criminal or civil liability. 4 involved in deciding when and under what circumstances
life-prolonging treatment can be withheld orSubsequent to the Quilan decision, thirty-nine states withdrawn. 7
and the District of Columbia enacted "Living Will"
statutes, "Death With Dignity" laws, "Natural Death" As the practice of writing "do-not-resuscitate" (DNR)
acts, or similar provisions in an attempt to remove the orders and withdrawing life support from terminally ill
uncertainty that forced Joseph Quinlan into court. patients became more accepted in the bivilian commu-
Generally speaking, the statutes allow individuals to nity, questions arose concerning the policy in Army
execute "living wills" or "advance directives" to inform hospitals. In 1978 the Army Health Services Command
4 Id. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
5 Alabama Natural Death Act, Ala. 'd e §§ 22-BA-I to -10 (1981); Alaska Rights of the Terminally I1l Act, Alaska Stat. §§ 18.12.010 to .100 (1986);
Arlzona Medical Treatment Decision Act, Ariz. Revi Stat. Ann. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1985); Arkansas Death With Dignity Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§
20-17-201 to -i8 (1987); California Natural Death Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); Colorado Medical Treatment
Decision Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987); Connecticut Death With Dignity Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 19A-570 to -575 (West Supp.
1988); Delaware -Death With Dignity Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act, D. C. Code Ann. §§
6-2421 to .2430 (Michie Supp. 1988); Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 765.01-.15 (Harrison Supp. 1987); Georgia Living
Wills Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-324 to -12 (1985 & Michie Supp. 1988); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 327D-1 to -27(1986 & Supp. 1987); Idaho Natural Death Act, Idaho Code §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Michie Supp. 1988); Illinois Living Will Act, Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710 (West Supp. 1988);Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Michie
Supp. 1988); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, Iowa Code Ann. §§ 144A.1-. 11 (West Supp. 1988); Kansas Natural Death Act, Kan. Stat. Ann.
§§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann..*§§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1988); Maine Living Wills Act, Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit. 22,§§ 2921-2931 (West Supp. 1987)- Md. Health-Gen., Code Ann. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Michie Supp. 1988); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving
Mechanisms, Miss. Code Ann. f§ 41-41-101 to'-121 (Supp. 1987); Missouri Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. §§
459.010-.055 (West Supp. 1988); Montana Living Will Act, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-9-101 to -111, 50-9-201 to -206 (1987); Nevada Withholding or
Withdrawal of Life Sustaining Procedures Act, Nev, Rev. Stat. §§ 449.540-.690 (1986); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document, N. H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 137-1-1:1 to :16 (Supp. 1987); New'Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1986); N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2960-2978
(West 1988) (provides for do-not-resuscitate orders "only); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1985);
Oklahoma Natural Death Act, Okla, Stat. Ann. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1988); Oregon Rights With Respect to Terminal Illness Act, Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 97.050-.090 (1984); South Carolina Death With Dignity Act, S. C. Code Ann. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1987); Tennessee
Right to Natural Death Act, Tenn. Code Ansi, §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Michie Supp. 1988); Texas Natural Death Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
4590h, § 1-11 (West Supp. 1988); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Michie Supp. 1988); Vermont( Terminal Care Document Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Virginia Natural Death Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :12 (Michie
Supp. 1987); Washington Natural Death Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (West Supp. 1987); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W.
Va. Code §§ 16-30-1 to ,10 (1985);i Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1987); Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-22-101 to -109
(1988).
6 See Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 737 (1987).
'Seventeen states and three federal district courts hbve dealt with the issues of withdrawing or withholding life-prolonging treatment since Quinlan
was decided. FEDERAL: Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp. 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987);
Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 602 F1 Stlpp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); ARIZONA: Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674(1987); CALIFORNIA: Childs v. Abramovice, No. A037920 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988)(WESTLAW 1988 WIL 127111); Conservatorship of
Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v.
Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal.
Rptr, 484 (1983); Dority v. Superior Court., 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983); COLORADO: Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419,
601 P.2d 1072 (1979); CONNECTICUT: Fqody v, Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn Super. Ct. 1984);
DELAWARE: In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); FLORIDA: John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Corbett v. D'Alessandro,
487 So. 2d-368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); GEORGIA:
In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); IOWA: Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); LOUISIANA: In re P.V.W., 424
So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); MAINE: In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); MASSACHUSETTS: Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School Y. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959,
review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 455 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); MISSOURI: Cruzan v.
Harmon, Mo. Sup. Ct. No. 70813 (Nov. 16, 1988), 57 U.S.L.W. 2324, 1988 WL 122100; MINNESOTA: In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1986);
NEW'JERSEY: In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529
A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985); lafelice-v-. Zarafu, 221 N.J. Super. 278, 534 A.2d 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); In re Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); In re Clark, 210 N.J. Super. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); NEW YORK: In re O'Connor, No. 312
(N.Y. Oct. 14, 1988), 57 U.S.L.W. 2241 (WESTLAW t988 WL 107046); Veteran's Admin. Medical Center v. Harvey U., 68 N.Y.2d 624, 505
N.Y.S.2d 70, 496 N.E.2d 229 (1986); In re Storar, 52,N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cer. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Delio v.
Westchester County Medical Center; 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); In re Beth
Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d!931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); Workmen's Circle Home and Infirmary v. Fink, 135 Misc. 2d 270,
514 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y., Sup. Ct. 1987); In re O'Brien, 135 Misc. 2d 1076, 517 N.Y.S,2d 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Vogel v. Forman, 134 Misc. 2d
395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Saunders v. State, -129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Crouse Irving Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock. 1,27 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); A.B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672, 477 N.Y.S.2d 281 (NY. Sup. Ct.
1984); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477,455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); OHIO: In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d
255, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Comm. Pleas 1980),
PENNSYLVANIA: in re Estate of Dorone, 517 Pa. 3, 534 A.2d 452 (1987); WASHINGTON: In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1988);
In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660
P.2d 738 (1983).
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* asked the Army Surgeon General if the Texas Natural
Death Act applied to Army hospitals in Texas.,The
Surgeon General replied that the Act did not apply and
th'at Army policy did not allow DNR or withdrawal of
life support orders. 8
As more courts, legislatures, and physicians recognized
the benefits of allowing patients to make these funda-
mental choices, the Army Surgeon General made several
attempts to revise the Army policy. Each time a pro-
posed policy was staffed for legal review, The Judge
,Advocate General cautioned that it was at least possible
that a physician withdrawing life support oi failing to
order resuscitation could face criminal prosecution in
some circumstances. Apparently unwilling to subject
Army physicians to this risk, the Surgeon General did
not change the policy.
The Surgeon General's reticence changed when the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search recommended that institutions develop policies to
implement DNR orders in appropriate cases. 9 Relying
upon the recommendations and reputation of the Presi-
dent's Commission, the Surgeon General decided to
approach the DNR and withdrawal of life support
policies as separate issues, and in 1985 promulgated a-
uniform policy governing DNR orders in Army
hospitals. 'o
While the new DNR policy brought the Army in line
with the civilian medical community's emerging practice
standards concerning resuscitation decisions, the Army
policy still did not allow withdrawal of life support. 1"
The ink was hardly dry on the new DNR policy,
however, -when Mrs. Martha Tune, the 71-year-old
widow of an Army officer, entered Walter Reed Army
Medical Center on February 21, 1985, complaining of
shortness of breath and chest pain. 32 Her physicians
ordered mechanical ventilation to treat her respiratory
problem. Subsequent diagnostic procedures revealed
fluid collecting around the heart, and laboratory exami-
nation of the fluid indicated the presence of cancer.
Treatment with antibiotics and surgery restored normal
heart function, but Mrs. Tune developed adult respira-
tory distress syndrome (ARDS) and became. respirator
dependent. Serial x-rays suggested the presence of tu-
mors in her lungs. 3 The combination of ARDS and
cancer made death a certainty, and the respirator was
only prolonging the inevitable. Mrs. Tune asked' the
physicians to remove the respirator and allow her to die.
Her doctors told her that if they had known the full
extent of her illness they would'not have ordered the
respirator originally, but since she was already on the
respirator, Army policy did not allow withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment. 14'
On February 27, 1985, Mrs. Tune's son filed a pro se
action in the District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking an order requirihg Walter Reed to remove Mrs.
Tune from the respirator. After appointing a guardian
ad litem and satisfying himself that Mrs. Tune was
competent, that she had a terminal illness, and that she
understood the consequences of her request, the judge
ordered the hospital officials to remove-the respirator. "5
The Tune case removed any latent doubts about the
legality of withdrawing life support in federal facilities,
and shortly thereafter the Army Surgeon General pub-
lished a uniform policy allowing withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment under specified circumstances. 16
The remainder of this article will discuss the substance
of the Army's DNR and withdrawal of life support
policies and will highlight areas that merit' special atten-
tion from judge advocates and members of the health
care team.
Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders
A patient who suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest in
an Army hospital will be resuscitated unless there is a
written DNR order in the medical record. 17 In other
words, initiating resuscitation is automatic and will only
be suspended when there is a written order to the
contrary. This prohibits "slow codes" and 'notify MOD
before coding" practices that developed to avoid the
policy against DNR orders. 18
a Letter, HQDA, DASG-PSA (13 Dec. 77) 1st Ind., 23 May 1978, subject: Texas Natural Death Act, reprinted in President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical,
and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 520-22 (1983).
9r President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego
Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 248-55 (1983) [hereinafter President's Cbmmission].'
"D Army Reg. 40-3, Medical Services: Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care, chap. 19 (15 Feb. 1985) [hereinafter AR 40-31.
" Id. para. 19-lb.
2 Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (D.D.C. 1985).,
13id.
" Id.
1 Id. at 1456.
I6 Letter, HQDA, DASG-PSQ, 30 Aug. 1985, subject: Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment [hereinafter Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining
Treatment Letter].
'7 AR 40-3, para. 19-3a.
to "Slow codes" and "notify MOD [medical officer of the day] before coding" were informal agreements between the medical staff, patients, and
patients' families to delay the initiation of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in a terminally ill patient who arrested. By delaying the initiation of
CPR, the patient died before he could be resuscitated and placed on life support apparatus. These practices were not limited to Army facilities, but
were common wherever written DNR orders were thought to be violations of law, policy, or good medical practice. See generally Younger,
Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: No Longer Secret, But Still a Problem, 17 Hastings Center Rep. 24 (1987); Fried, Terminating Life Support: Out of the
Closet, 295 New Eng. J. Med. 390 (1976).
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Under the Army policy, a DNR order is appropriate
when a patient "will not benefit from resuscitation." 19
According to the regulation, patients who will not
benefit from resuscitation- "include those who are irre-
versibly, terminally ill or those in a persistent chronic
vegetative state." 20 Though, the regulation may seem to
allow a DNR order for patients who do not fit the
definition of "irreversibly, terminally ill" 21 or who are
not in a "persistent or chronic vegetative state," 22 other
provisions are more restrictive. For example, the regula-
tion provides that the "voluntary choice of a competent
and informed patient wholls irreversibly, terminally ill
will determine whether cardiopulmonary resuscitation
will be undertaken. " 23 Furthermiore, before the order is
written the prognosis must' be determined .by the pa-
tient's attending physician and the chief of the service or
the deputy commander fdr' dlinidal services or his or her
delegee. 7A Thus, the regulation 'requires 'that even the
competent patient fit the irreversibly, terminally ill
prognosis before a DNR order is 'appropriate. While this
is consistent with th5 ArmYl"olicy governing withdrawal
of life support, 25 it has the potential of Infringing upon
the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 26 The
regulation does recognize, however, that a "competent
patient has the legal right 'to refuse medical treatment at
any time, even .if it is lifesaving." 27 In i view of the
contradictory provisions of the regulation, the "'tough
case," i.e., a non-terminal patient requesting a DNR
order or refusing other lifesaving treatment, should be
resolved individually under the law of the state where the
facility is located. u This usually involves balancing the
government's interest in preserving life, protecting inno-
cent third parties (especially children who are dependent
upon the patient), preventing suicide, and preserving the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession against the
patient's right to privacy, self-determination, and, in
appropriate cases, free exercise of religion. '9
The DNR order is only an order to forego the
otherwise automatic initiation of cardiopulmonary resus-
citation; it does not alter other treatment decisions. 30 To
avoid possible confusion, physicians should write orders
for supportive care, the relief of pain, and other
treatment separately. 31 Only credentialed physicians who
are members of the medical staff may write 'DNR orders;
residents and other doctors in graduate medical educa-
tion programs may not write DNR orders. 32 Like any
other aspect of medical care, the completion of the
medical record is important. Army policy requires that
the DNR be written on the order sheet, dated, and
signed. 33 Furthermore, the physician must include in a
progress note an explanation of the rationale behind the
order. 34 The progress note must also disclose whether
the patient is competent 35 and how the competency
19 AR 40-3, para. 19-3b.
20ld"
2 An "irreversibly, terminally ill" patient is any patient with "a progressive disease or injury known to terminate in death and where no additional
course of therapy offers any reasonable expectation of remission." Id. para. 19-2c.
22 A "persistent or chronic vegetatiye state" is a ,chronic state of diminished consciousness resulting from severe generalized brain injury in which
there is no reasonable possibility of Improvement to a cognitive state." Id. para. 19-2f.
23 Id. para. 19-6a (emphasis added).
74 Id. para. 19-2c.
23 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (hospital's refusal to remove feeding tube from
non-terminal quadriplegic patient with a 15-year life expectancy violated the patient's right to refuse medical treatment).
27 AR 40-3, para. 19-3f.
2s Cf. id. para. 2-19f.
29 See, e.g., Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 765, 515 N.E.2d 286 (1987). appeal granted, 118 I1. 2d 543, 520 N.E.2d 385 (1988); In re Brown, 478 So.2d
1033 (Miss. 1985); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987); and Gray v.
Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), all holding that the patient's interests outweighed the state's interests. But see Cruzan v. Harmon, Mo. Sup.
Ct. No. 70813 (Nov. 16, 1988), 57 U.S.L.W. 2324, 1988 WL 122100 (Mo. 1988) (state's interest in life outweighed privacy interests of incompetent
patient in a persistent vegetative state whose guardian sought to withdraw artificial feeding from his ward); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987),
reh'g granted and judgment vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988) (caesarean section performed over the objection of the mother to save the life of the
fetus); In re Estate of Dorone, 517 Pa. 3, 534 A.2d 452 (1987) (in an emergency situation the court may temporarily appoint the hospital
administrator as guardian to consent to blood transfusions for an unconscious Jehovah's Witness patient).
3o AR 40-3, para. 19-3c.
31 Id.
32 Id. para. 19-3d.
33 Id. para. 19-4.
34 Id.
3' A competent patient is an adult (18 years of age or over or emancipated as determined by state law) "who has the ability to communicate andQunderstand information and the ability to reason and deliberate sufficiently well about the choices involved." Id. para. 19-2d. Minors below 14 years
of age are deemed incompetent and active duty soldiers 17 years old are deemed emancipated. Id. An incompetent patient is a minor (17 years of age
and under and not emancipated) or someone "who does not have the ability to reason and deliberate sufficiently well about the choices involved."
Id. para. 19-2e.
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determination was reached. 36 The doctor must summa-
rize in the progress note discussions with the patient,
family members, or legal guardian and document any
review by the ethics panel. 31 The regulation specifically
prohibits asking the patient to sign a release or consent
form; 38 therefore, a complete and thorough progress
note is critical in defending against any claim of lack of
informed consent.
The voluntary choice of the competent and informed
patient determines whether a DNR order will be
written. 39 The Army policy encourages the medical staff
to discuss the various options with the patient in
appropriate cases. 40 The policy also recognizes that
often a direct approach to, such a sensitive and personal
matter is inadvisable and recommends a "general discus-
sion" of the patient's preferences. 41 If a "general
discussion" leads to an informed and voluntary decision
to request a DNR order, the order may be written. If
neither the doctor nor the patient can addres the issue
directly, the order should not be written. In other-words,
the "general discussion" may be an appropriate way to
raise the issue with a patient, but it is not a substitute
for an informed and voluntary decision to forego
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
Once the competent patient elects to request a DNR
order, he or she determines whether family members will
be told of the decision. 42 If the patient does not want
family members to know of the decision, a disinterested
physician or nurse (one who is not a member of the
treatment team) will enter the request for confidentiality
in the medical record. 43 This procedure brings a neutral
player with a different perspective into the equation and
insulates the treatment team, to some degree, from the'
conflicting interests of the patient and his or her family.
In any case, the decision of the competent patient will be
respected.
Resuscitation decisions for incompetent patients are a
bit more complicated. If an incompetent patient made
"firm and explicit" verbal or written directives regarding
resuscitation while still competent, the next of kin or
legal guardian and the medical staff should honor the
patient's directives "unless there is reason to believe the
patient's choice has changed or would change."_" Of
course,, if there is reason to believe that the patient's
choice has changed, or would change, it places in
question the "firmness" and "explicitness" of the origi-
nal directives. Unfortunately, the regulation offers no
guidance on what factors the medical staff and the next
of kin or legal guardian should consider in determining
whether the patient's choice has changed or would
change.
Once the patient's incompetency has been established,
the next of kin or legal guardian ' becomes the surrogate
decisionmaker. If the attending staff and the surrogate
decisionmaker agree that a DNR order is appropriate,
the order may be entered in the medical record. 45 If the
surrogate disagrees with the medical staff's recommenda-
tion for a DNR order, the case must be referred to the
hospital ethics panel. 46 If the ethics panel resolves the
disagreement and all parties concur in the appropriate-
ness of the DNR order, the order will be written. If an
agreement is not reached, the order will not be written
and resuscitation will be initiated unless a court directs
otherwise. 47
If an incompetent patient has no next of kin, legal
guardian, or other 'person authorized under state law to
consent to medical, treatment for the patient and the
medical staff believes a DNR *order is appropriate, Jhey
should refer the case to the ethics panel and the deputy
commander for clinical services (DCCS). 41 The regula-
tion does not, however, tell either the ethics panel or the
DCCS what to do. Its silence on this issue may mean
that they become the surrogate decisionmaker. Prudence
dictates otherwise. If an incompetent patient does not
have a next of kin, legal guardian, or other person
authorized to consent to medical treatment under state
law, the hospital should contact the local staff judge
advocate and seek his or ' her assistance in having a
guardian appointed. This, of course, applies to all
treatment decisions, not just to DNR orders.
Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment
The Army policy on the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment was, in large measure, influenced by Tune v.
Walter Reed Army Medical Center 49 and the President's
3' Incompetency must be verified by clinical assessment of mental and emotional status. Id. para. 19-2e.'
37 Id.
38 d
~'Id.
39 id.'para. 19-6a.
"
0 Id. para. 19-6b.
41 /d.
42 Id. para. 19-6d.
43 id.
44 Id. para. 19-7a.
41 Id. para. 19-7d.
4' The ethics panel is composed of at least two physicians, a nurse, a chaplain, and a representative of the local staff judge advocate. Id. para. 19-2g.
47 Id. para. 19,7d.
48 Id. para. 19.7b.
49 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
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Commission. 50 The policy allows competent patients in
a "terminal condition" 5 or a "persistent or -chronic
vegetative state" 52 to decline life-sustaining treatment. "1
It also allows the next of kin or legal guardian to decide
whether treatment should be'withdrawn if the patient is
Nincompetent. 54
The basic philosophy underlying the Army's policy for
withdrawal of life support is to support and sustain life
when it is reasonable:
The Army Medical Department is committed to
the principle of supporting and sustaining life when
it is reasonable to do so. 'Life-supporting techniques
and the application of medical technology may not
cure a patient's disease or disability or reverse a
patient's course. Some 'patients who suffer from a
terminal illness and are 'inclurable May reach a point
where continued or additional treatment is not only
unwanted by the patient but medically unsound. In
such cases, medical treatment does not prevent
death but merely defers the moment of its occur-
rence. The attending physician must decide whether
continued efforts constitute a reasonable' attempt at
prolonging life or whether the patient's illness has
reached such a point that further intensive, or
extensive, care is in fact merely "postponing the
moment of death which is otherwise imminent. 55
Thus, under the Army policy,, when medical intervention
or treatment will only artificially delay the death of a
patient in a persistent or chronic vegetative state or
afflicted with a terminal condition, sustaining life is no
longer reasonable and 'withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment is appropriate.
The Army policy allows only "qualified patients,"
i.e., those who have a terminal condition or are in a
persistent or chronic vegetative state, to request with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment. The diagnosis and
prognosis must be made and certified in writing by two
physicians, one of whom must be the attending
physician. 56 As with the DNR policy; -allowing only
certain patients the right to refuse treatment denies other
patients their right to decide what medical treatment to
accept or reject. 57
The policy for withdrawal of life support, like the
DNR policy, recognizes the competent patient 58 as the
decisionmaker. 59 The next of kin or legal guardian,
along with the attending physician, determines whether
to withdraw life support from an incompetent patient. 60
The policy directs a surrogate decisionmaker to deter-
mine whether the withdrawal'of life-sustaining treatment
will be in the "patient's best interest." 61 In determining
the patient's best interests, the Army policy directs the
surrogate to consider: "(1) relief of suffering, (2) quality
as well as extent of life sustained, and (3) 'substituted
judgment doctrine': What the patient would have wanted
if competent." 62
Army policy requires that the hospital ethics panel
review the case: 1) where there is doubt about the
propriety of withdrawing life support; 2) where there is
disagreement among the treating physicians, among
members of the family, or between the treating physician
and family members; or 3) where an incompetent patient
has no next of kin or legal guardian. 63 The ethics panel
is an ad hoc "advisory committee" that draws members
from administration, medicine, nursing, pastoral care,
social work, and the community. A representative of the
staff judge advocate must be a member. 6
The Army policy defines "life-sustaining" treatment
as "any medical procedure or intervention which serves
only to artificially prolong dying . . . . Intravenous
therapies and lavage [sic] feeding are medical
interventions." 65 Treatment and procedures designed to
alleviate pain are not considered life-sustaining
-o President's Commission, supra note 9..
" A "terminal condition" is an "incurable condition resulting from injury or disease in which imminent death is predictable with reasonable medical
certainty." Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, End., supra note 16 , para. 2b.
52 A "persistent or chronic vegetative state" is a "chronic state of diminished consciousness resulting from severe generalized brain injury in which
there is no reasonable possibility of improvement to a cognitive state." Id. para. 2c.
53 Id. para. 4a.
Id. para. 3b.
I d. para. 3a.
6 Id. para. 2g.
s7 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
3s The definitions of "competent" :and "incompetent" are the same for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as they are for do-not-resuscitate
orders. See supra note 35
59 Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, Encl., supra note 16 , para. 4a.
0 Id. para. 4b.
61 id.
62 Id.
613 Id. para. 2i.
Q 4 Id. Note that the membership of an ethics panel considering withdrawal of life support differs from that of a panel considering a DNR order. See
supra note 46.
65 Id. para. 2a.
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treatment. 6 Thus, artificial feeding as well as mechani-
cal ventilation can be discontinued in appropriate
circumstances, 67
Once a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
has been made, the order must be documented in the
patient's medical records. The attending physician must
-enter the order, the date and time of the order, and his
or her legible signature on the order sheet. The progress
notes must include:
(1) A description of the patient's medical condition
corroborating the prognosis, including reference to
any consultations relevant to the decision to termi-
nate.
(2) A summary of discussions with the patient, NOK
or guardian concerning the medical prognosis and
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
(3) The competency status of the patient and the
basis for a finding of incompetency.
(4) The authority upon which the final decision is
based (e.g., competent patient's informed consent,
Ethics Panel, court, etc.). 68
Potential Problems
In an area so filled with legal, medical, emotional,
ethical, spiritual, and philosophical aspects, crafting a
policy to satisfy all competing interests is virtually
impossible. Thus, the Army DNR and withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment policies are not perfect. Careful
and caring implementation of the policies, with an
awareness of potential problem areas, will, however,
accommodate most concerns.
The Ethics Panel
Both the DNR and the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment policies require ethics panels to become in-
volved in certain cases. Both policies limit the involve-
ment of the panel to those cases where there is an
incompetent patient and some doubt or disagreement as
to the propriety of a DNR order or withdrawal of life
support. Furthermore, the membership on the panels
established by the respective policy directives is not
consistent, and neither policy gives any real guidance as
to the role or function of the panel. Equally troubling is
the fact that over eighteen months after ethics panels
were required in certain circumstances, thirty-three per-
cent of the Army hospitals responding to a survey had
not established them. 69
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research identified four general functions that an ethics
committee can serve:
They can review-the case to confirm the responsible
physician's diagnosis and prognosis of a patient's
medical condition.
They can provide a forum for discussing broader
social and ethical concerns raised by a particular
case; such bodies may also have an education role,
especially by teaching all professional staff how to
identify, frame, and resolve ethical problems.
They can be a means for formulating policy and
guidelines regarding such decisions.
Finally, they can review decisions made by others
(such as physicians and surrogates) about the treat-
ment of specific patients or make such decisions
themselves. 70
By limiting the involvement of ethics committees to
situations where there is disagreement over the propriety
of a DNR order or withdrawal of life support for an
incompetent patient, or where there is no surrogate
decisionmaker for an incompetent patient, the Army
policies offer little guidance on the function of the ethics
committee. Argbably, it exists as a decisionmaking body
in the case -of a patient without a surrogate. 7, When
there is a dispute over the propriety of a DNR or
withdrawal of life support order, the panel's role im-
pliedly is that of a forum for discussion that may lead to
agreement. Because the membership consists of other
than physicians, its role must extend beyond merely
confirming the diagnosis and prognosis. The vast major-
ity of respondents to a recent survey on ethics commit-
tees in Army hospitals thought the best use of the
committee was in an advisory or consulting role in
dealing with treatment decisions for the terminally ill. 72
Those responding also identified education, case review,
and policy interpretation as useful ethics committee
functions. 73
The experience of Madigan Army Medical Center's
ethics committee illustrates the education, bioethical
policymaking and interpreting, and case review and
consultation functions. 74 The Madigan committee per-
66Id.
" The Army policy includes "lavage feeding" as life-sustaining treatment. "Lavage" means to irrigate or wash out an organ, Dorland's Illustrated
Medical Dictionary 716 (26th ed. 1981), and is not generally thought of as a way to provide nutrition. The policy probably intends to include
"gavage" feeding as life-sustaining treatment. "Gavage" means "forced feeding especially through a tube passed into the stomach." Id.'at 544.
60 Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, Encl., supra note 16 , para. 5a.
"Carter, Medical Ethics Committee - A Survey of Army Hospitals, 153 Mil. Med. 426, 427 (1988).
70 President's Commission, supra note 9 , at 160-61.
71 One of the documentation requirements for a withdrawal of life support order is indicating "the authority upon which the final decision is based
(e.g., competent patient's informed consent, Ethics Panel, court, etc.)." Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, Encl., supra note 16 , para.
Sa(4) (emphasis added).
72 Carter, supra note 69, at 428.
73 id.
'4 Madden, Reeder, Cragun, Krug, and Browne, Evolution of Military Ethics Commitees, 152 Ml. Med. 613 (1987).
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forms its educational role by sponsoring formal and
informal presentations on bioethical issues. Formal pre-
sentations range from workshops on particular issues to
"ethics rounds" that use case studies to illustrate ethical
problems that arise in the hospital setting. Informal
teaching involves collecting and sharing ethics literature
with the staff and engaging in informal discussions
about hypothetical cases or actual -dilemmas. 7' The
ethical ramifications of developing and implementing
institutional policies dealing with the treatment of AIDS
patients, organ harvesting, and the allocation of limited
hospital resources are uniquely suited to ethics commit-
tee review. , Consultation and case review provides
members of the staff, patients, or patients' families a
forum to discuss the difficult issues and decisions that
modern technology places upon us. The committee does,
not decide for the patient, but merely provides the
opportunity to discuss the issue and, if possible, reach a
consensus. Even though the committee does not decide
the question, the recommended or consensus solution
can have a strong psychological impact upon those who
must decide. 77
To perform any of these roles, however, ethics com-
mittees must be formally established, their existence
publicized, and their members trained.' Unfortunately,
the limited involvement of the committees envisioned by
the current policies hardly provides the experience neces-
sary for the members to perform any of their functions
well. Hospital commanders who require the.ethics com-
mittee to review-all DNR andI withdrawal ofilife support
decisions will help the committee acquire valuable experi-
ence so that when the difficult situations arise, e.g., a
disagreement over the propriety of writing a DNR order
or withdrawing life support, the committee will be able
to provide real assistance to the professional staff, the
patient, and the patient's family. The current policies
almost guarantee that the ethics committee will have less
experience in dealing with these issues than the profes-
sional staff and will be of little help with the difficult
cases. With the experience gained from greater involve-
ment in a larger number of cases, the committee can
perform the educational and policy formulation roles
more effectively. 71
Selecting the Surrogate
The "next of kin" or the patient's legal guardian is
the surrogate decisionmaker under both the DNR and
withdrawal of life support policies. Determining the
identity of the legal guardian is not difficult; the
individual appointed by the appropriate court with
authority to act for the patient is the one to whom the
medical staff should look for health care decisions. The
"next of kin" is a bit more elusive. Neither Army
Regulation 40-3 nor the withdrawal of life support policy
letter defines "next of kin." Intuitively, the spouse or
other close family member qualifies and is generally
looked to by the medical community to make decisions
for incompetent patients. 79 But in selecting a surrogate
decisionmaker the question should not be: "Who is the
next of kin?" Rather, we should ask: "Who best knows
the patient's goals, desires, and preferences, and who is
most concerned about the patient's welfare?" In most
instances this person will be the spouse or other close
family member. The President's Commission strongly
favors family members as surrogate decisionmakers be-
cause:
(1) The family is generally most concerned about
the good of the patient.
(2) The family will also usually be most knowledge-
able about the patient's goals, preferences, and
values.
(3) The family deserves recognition as an important
social unit that ought to be 'treated, within limits, as
a responsible decisionmaker in matters that inti-
mately affect its members.
(4) Especially in a society in which many other
traditional forms of community have eroded, partic-
ipation in a family is often an important dimension
of personal fulfillment.
(5) Since a protected sphere of privacy and auton-
omy is required for the flourishing of this interper-
sonal union, institutions ;and the state should be
reluctant to intrude, particularly regarding matters
that are personal and on which there is a wide range
of opinion in society. 10
Perhaps the best surrogate decisionmaker, and one not
mentioned in the Army policy, is an individual desig-
nated by the patient in a durable power of attorney, or
similar document, to make health care decisions in the
event of the patient's incompetency. "I Looking to such
an individual gives full deference to the patient's auton-
omy and relieves the medical staff of the burden of
selecting the surrogate. Furthermore, an individual with
the foresight to appoint a decisionmaker has probably
7" Id. at 614.
76Id.
77 Id. at 615 (citing Cranford, Hester, and Ashley, Institutional Ethics Committees:. Issues of Confidentiality and Immunity, 13 Law. Med. & Health
Care 52 (1985)).
78 This does not mean that reviewing cases is the only, or even the best way for an ethics committee to develop expertise. In fact, education of the
committee is required before they can assist in case review or perform any of their other functions. See Madden, Reeder, Cragun, Krug, and Browne,
supra note 74, at 613. ("Committee members must be educated in basic philosophical concepts, current bioethical problems, and the mechanics of
committee functioning.").
"See Deardorff, Informed Consent, Termination of Medical Treatment, and the Federal Tort Claims Act - A New Proposal for the Military Health
Care System, 115 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 40-43 (1987).
So See President's Commission, supra note 9 , at 128.
8' See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code §§ 2430-2500 (West Supp. 1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 449.800-449.860 (Michie Supp. 1987); Unif. Prob. Code § 5-501.
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made clear his or her desires regarding the types of
treatment to accept or reject. This bit of planning eases
the burden on both the doctor and the decisionmaker
and ensures that the patient's desires will 
be paramount.
There are some circumstances when the medical staff
must select another, surrogate. This may occur when: 1)
the apparent surrogate evidences interests that conflict
with those of the patient; or 2) there are indications that
the surrogate does not have the patient's welfare and
wishes at heart, or is not aware of or intends to
disregard the patient's values, desires, or expressed
wishes. 82 Although it is the medical staff that selects the
surrogate, 83 the judge advocate must be available to
assist in identifying, disqualifications in the presumed
surrogate and in designating an appropriate surrogate.
This assistance may take the form of advising the
physician to continue supportive care until a court
appoints a guardian to act for the patient. If the
apparent surrogate is the legal guardian or is designated
through a power of attorney, court action may be
required to appoint a new surrogate.
Both the DNR and withdrawal of life support policies
require consultation with the ethics panel if an incompe-
tent patient has no legal guardian or next of kin and the
attending physician thinks a DNR or withdrawal of
support order is appropriate. 84 While neither policy
specifically dictates that the ethics panel becomes the
decisionmaker in these cases, it can certainly be inferred.
The President's Commission noted the difficult and
cumbersome process of obtaining judicial appointment
of a guardian and recommended that health care institu-
tions develop policies to designate surrogates for patients
without close family. 85In spite of this fact, however, in
the absence of legislation or a specific policy that clearly
and unequivocally sets out the standard to follow, DNR
and. withdrawal of life support orders should not be
written for incompetent patients who do not have an
appropriate surrogate decisionmaker. In light of the
seriousness of the decision at stake, it is unjustified to
infer from the ambiguities in the current policy that the
ethics panel becomes the surrogate decisionmaker in
these cases. The better course is to continue medical
treatment and seek judicial appointment of a
guardian. 86 Judge advocates must know the applicable
law and procedure in their respective jurisdictions and be
prepared to advise and assist in obtaining appropriate
judicial action.
Deciding for the Incompetent
There can be no greater responsibility than making a
life or death decision for another. The surrogate deci-
sionmaker, who by definition shares a close bond with
the patient, 87 must make decisions while under tremen-
dous emotional strain. Because of the seriousness of the
decision and the emotional involvement of the decision-
maker, the law should provide a decisional framework.
Unfortunately, the Army policy does little to aid the
surrogate decisionmaker.
The Army DNR policy specifically directs surrogate
decisionmakers to follow explicit verbal or written direc-
tives made by the patient while competent unless there is
reason to believe that the patient's choice has changed. 88
Thus, living wills executed under state law will serve as
evidence of the patient's wishes. This approach gives full
deference to the patient's rights of self-determination
and privacy and lightens the burden on the decision-
maker. But where the patient has not made "firm and
explicit . ., . directives," 89 the policy leaves the surrogate
scant guidance. In this instance, the regulation merely
provides that "[aifter assessment of the. benefits" a
DNR order may be entered if there is agreement between
the next of kin and the patient's physicians. 9
The policy for withdrawal of life support, on the other
hand, does not mention the effect of a prior verbal or
written expression and directs the surrogate to make a
decision based upon the patient's "best interest." 9' In
determining the patient's "best interest," the surrogate
should consider the: "(1) relief of suffering; (2) quality
as well as extent of life sustained, and; (3) 'substituted
judgment doctrine': What the patient would have wanted
if competent." 92 Not only does this offer little real
guidance to the decisionmaker, it confuses two separate
decisionmaking models, the "best interest of the
patient" model and the "substituted judgment" model.
The "substituted judgment" standard requires the
decisionmaker to do what the patient would have done.
It gives maximum deference to the patient's right of
self-determination even if that decision is not objectively
in the patient's best interest. In other words, it is the
patient's definition of "best interest" that is respected,
rather than some objective standard. 93 As explained by
one court, the substituted judgment represents a shift in
emphasis
82 See President's Commission, supra note 9, at 128-29.
83 See id. at 127.
64 AR 40-3, para. 19-7b; Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, Encl., supra note 16, para. 4b(3).
85 President's Commission, supra note 9 , at 131-32.
86 See, e.g., In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
87 Both the DNR and withdrawal of life support policy designate the "next of kin" (or legal guardian if one has been appointed) as the surrogate
decisionmaker. See AR 40-3, paras. 19-3b and 19-7d; Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, Encl., supra note 16 , para. 4b.
8' AR 40-3, para. 19-7a.
89 Id.
90 Id. para. 19-7d.
9' Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, End., supra note 16 , para. 4b.
92 id.
I See generally, President's Commission, supra note 9 , at 132-33.
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away from a paternalistic view of what is "best"
for a patient toward a reaffirmation that the, basic
question is what decision will comport with the will
of the, person involved, whether that person be
-. competent or incompetent. As to the latter type of
person, we concluded that the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment, while not withoutits shortcomings,
best served to emphasize the importance of honor-
ing the privacy and dignity of the individual. 94
Of course, in order to apply the "substituted judgment"'
model, there must be some 'evidence of what the patient
would have decided. Prior oral or written directives are
the best evidence of the patient's 'desires and should be
given effect. 95
The "best interest" model generally requires, the
surrogate to consider such factors ,as, the relief of
suffering, the preservation or restoration of function,
and :the quality and extent of the life sustained as viewed
by the patient. 96 The "quality of life" component tries
to determine the value of the patient's life to the patient
and does not measure the value of life by the extent of
the patient's ability to contribute,, or produce in
society. 97
The confusion in the Army policies is manifest. The
DNR policy, while deferring to the patient's desires if
they are evidenced by oral or written directives, imposes
a vague "assessment of the benefits" standard when
"firm and explicit" directives are absent. the policy for
withdrawal of life support purports td impose an objec-
tive " best interest" test but includes the subjective
"substituted judgment" doctrine as only ne 'factor to
consider. Both policies denigrate the 'patient's right of
self-determination and leave surrogate decisionmakers
with 'conflicting guidance. Because tie issue in both the
DNR 'and withdrawal of life support situatidns is the
same, the decisionmaking standards 'should be uniform
and give maximum deference to patient autonomy.
The approach adopted by the New Jersey 1Supreme
Court in In re Conroy 98 for making termination of
artificial feeding decisions for incompetent nursing home
patients with serious and irreversible mental and physical
impairments and a limited life expectancy provides a
useful model. The court created a decisionmaking hierar-
chy that deferred to the patient's desires as much as
possible and resorted to objective criteria only when
evidence of the patient's wishes was untrustworthy or
lacking completely.
The first level of decisionmaking is a pure subjective
test. Under this standard the decisionmaker will make
the same decision the patient would have made if
competent. The court noted that written directives in the
form of living wills or powers of attorney and oral
statements or directives were probative of what the
patient would decide if competent. 99 Reactions by the
patient to medical treatment administered to others, the
religious beliefs of the patient, and his or her decisions
regarding other aspects of medical care were also consid-
ered by the court to give insight into the patient's
decision. 100 Against this evidence, the decisionmaker.
must consider the remoteness, consistency, thoughtful-
ness, and specificity of the patient's prior statements and
conduct in order to accurately assess their probative
value.
[A]n offhand remark about not wanting to live
underrcertain circumstances made by a person when
young and in the peak of health would not in itself
constitute clear proof twenty years later that he
would want life-sustaining treatment withheld under
those circumstances. In contrast, a carefully consid-
ered position, especially if written, that a person
had maintained over a number of years or that he
had acted upon in comparable circumstances might
be clear evidence of his intent. '0'
For those patients for whom the evidence of subjective
intent is remote or unclear, the Conroy court allowed
removal of life-sustaining treatment if either of two
"best interest" tests were met. The first test, a "limited-
objective test," allows withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment 'when there is some trustworthy evidence that
the patient would have refused the treatment, and the
decisionmaker is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens
of the patient's continued life with the treatment out-
weigh the benefits of that life for him." 102 The test
requires some trustworthy evidence of what the patient
'4Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 431, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986).
95 If the patient has executed a living will or a durable power of attorney that spells out the patient's wishes in the particular circumstances, the
surrogate really has no decision to make. The patient has already decided the issue and the surrogate and the medical treatment team need only to
implement the patient's decision. Even though courts refer to this as "substituted judgment," it is not a substitute for the patient's judgment at all.
The term should be reserved for those situations where the patient has not clearly decided the issue and the surrogate must consider all available
evidence to determine what the patient would have decided if he or she were competent. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
President's Commission, supra note 9 , at 134-35.
97 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (1985) ("We expressly decline to authorize decision-making based on assessments of
the personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the value of that life to others. .... To do so would create an intolerable risk for socially
isolated and defenseless people suffering from physical or mental handicaps.").
98 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
SId. at 1229-30.
0o Id. at 1230.
'0 Id.
102 Id. at 1232. The Army withdrawal of life support "best interest" standard, which has both an objective and a subjective component, is essentially
the same as the Conroy "limited-objective" test. Unlike the Conroy test, the Army policy does not set out the benefits and burdens that should be
balanced.
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would have decided, even though that evidence, standing
alone, is insufficient to" satisfy the pure subjective
standard. Furthermore, the decisionmaker must also find
that the treatment in question would "merely prolong
the patient's suffering and not provide him with any net
benefit." 103 Determining whether the treatment provides
a "net benefit" requires an evaluation of the degree,
expected duration, and constancy of pain and suffering
with and without the life-sustaining treatment, and the
possibility that the pain and suffering could be reduced
or controlled by drugs or means other, than terminating
life support. 104
For those situations where there is no trustworthy
evidence of what the patient would have decided, the
Conroy court devised, yet. a third test. Under this
"pure-objective" standard, life-sustaining treatment
may be withdrawn when,
as under the limited-objective test, the net burdens
of the patient's life with the treatment . . . clearly
and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient
derives from life. Further, the recurring, unavoid-
able and severe pain of the patient's life with the
treatment should be such that the effect of adminis-
tering life-sustaining treatment would be
inhumane. 105
The, only court to consider the Army policy held that
the substituted judgment standard applied., In Newman
v. United States 106 Mary Ellen Newman was a comatose
patient in an Army medical center. She had suffered
severe and irreversible brain damage as a result of two
massive heart attacks several months earlier. There was
virtually no hope for her recovery and the only medical
care she was receiving consisted of comfort measures, a
Foley catheter, and the administration of nutrition and
hydration through a naso-gastric tube. Her doctors
notified her husband that she was a long term domicil-
iary patient and that he would have to transfer her from
the Army medical facility to a private nursing home. At
that point, Mr. Newman asked the Army doctors to
remove'the naso-gastric tube and allow his wife to die.
While the physicians agreed that there was little or
nothing they could do to reverse Mrs. Newman's condi-
103 Id.
tion, they objected to allowing her to die of dehydration.
Mrs. Newman still had a ,swallow reflex and could
swallow food that was placed in her mouth. The tube
feeding was merely more convenient and safer than
trying to feed her with a spoon. When the Army doctors
refused to withdraw the naso-gastric tube, Mr. Newman
filed suit in federal district court asking the judge to
order the Army to stop feeding his wife artificially. The
court held that the substituted judgment doctrine was the
proper standard to apply and that plaintiff's testimony
of his wife's desires as she expressed them to him some
years before in casual conversation was insufficient to
meet the burden of proofin light of the objections by
the medical staff.
Until the Army policy is amended to clarify the
applicable decisionmaking standards, the ambiguities in
the current policy should be resolved in favor of the
patient's right to self-determination. Accordingly, surro-
gate decisionmakers should first determine if the patient
has already made the decision. Living wills or other
formal expression of desires relieves the surrogate of any
"decision." The medical treatment team and the surro-
gate need only implement the patient's decision.,If the
patient has not made a firm or formal declaration of his
or her wishes, the surrogate must try to determine what
the patient would have decided if competent. The
surrogate should consider prior oral and written state-
ments that reflect the patient's views even though these
statements do not directly address the precise issue at
hand. The patient's reactions to prior medical treatment
given to others as well as previous decisions the patient
made about personal medical care will be probative. The
patient's religious beliefs and practices will give insight
into the patient's views on how he or she might decide
the issue. If the patient were competent and making the
decision, he or she would evaluate all of the medical
evidence available. Accordingly, the surrogate should
consider the prognosis, the degree of suffering with and
without the treatment, the risks Of various treatment
options, and the level of mental and physical functioning
of the patient. 07 If there is absolutely no evidence of
the patient's subjective intent, the Conroy "pure-
objective" standard provides a workable decisionmaking
model. 10
"o' Id. In a subsequent decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that "pain and suffering" consisted of more than just physical
anguish; it included the humiliation and indignities of being kept alive by machines. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
105 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The Army DNR decisionmaking standard seems to adopt a "subjective" test initially and leap to a
"pure-objective" test if "firm and explicit" directives were not made by the patient.
It seems somewhat incongruous that an affirmative decision must be made to discontinue treatment that is by all accounts "inhumane." One
would think that the legal, ethical, and medical problems would be with continuing such "treatment." not withdrawing it. The problem, however, is
one of degree. Physicians do not initiate a course of treatment to hurt their patients. The difficulty arises in determining when the treatment has
ceased being beneficial and begun being a burden. Some commentators have suggested that these decisions be made on an "anti-cruelty" basis.
Under this approach, applied only to incompetent patients for whom there is no evidence of what their decision would be if competent, the
decisionmaker balances the benefits of the diagnostic or therapeutic procedure against the harm it will inflict upon the patient. Thus, it applies the
principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. See Braithwaite and Thomasma, New Guidelines on Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment in
Incompetent Patients: An Anti-Cruelty Policy, 104 Annals Internal Med. 711 (1986).
i06 No. EP-86-CA-276 (W.D. Tex., filed Aug. 21, 1986).
107 Though the Conroy court called this the best interest "limited-objective" standard, because it seeks to determine what the patient's decision would
be under the circumstances, it is really the "substituted judgment" standard. The surrogate is deciding for the patient from the patient's perspective.
"o' Because the surrogate decisionmaker should be one who is aware of the patient's goals, desires, preferences, activities, lifestyle, philosophy, and
interests, it is difficult to imagine a situation where no evidence of the patient's subjective intent is available. Thus, the surrogate decisionmakers that
must decide for patients in Army facilities should not have to resort to a "pure objective" best interest standard. The situation may arise, however,
when the patient does not have a family meiber or close friend to act as a surrogate and a guardian must be appointed. Under these circumstances
the decision of the guardian should be subject to judicial review and supervision.
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Withdrawing Nutrition and Hydration,
Withdrawing or withholding nutrition and hydration
in appropriate situations have been sustained by the
'. courts '09 and endorsed by the American Medical
Association 110 The issue is not without controversy,
however. "' ICourts and medical ethicists who approve
of the cessation of artificial feeding usually, find no
difference between sustaining a patient with oxygen from
a mechanical respirator and, providing nourishment
through a naso-gastric tube, intravenous line, or other
method. 112 Both artificial respiration and artificial nour-
ishment, so the argument goes, merely prolong the
inevitable moment of death and neither offers any hope
of curing the illness involved. Others see a distinction
that requires a different approach:
Should the provision of food and drink be
regarded as medical care? It seems, rather, to be the
sort of care that all human beings :owe each other.
All living beings need food and water, in order to
live, but such nourishment does! not iiselflieal or
cure disease. When we stop feedinrg the petmdnently
unconscious patient, we are not withdrawing from
the battle against any illness or disease; we are
withholding the nourishment that Spstains life. "3
As importani as the philosophical debdt over the
withdrawal of nutrition is the practical mattek of ensur-
ing that the patient or the patient's surr6gat6 under-
stands what support will' be withdrawn.' If the patient or
the surrogate consents to "withdrdwa of life-sustaining
treatment" but does not realize' that life-"sustaining
treatment includes food and water, can they be said to
have given informed consent? The layinan inay think
that life-sustaining treatment means the respirator but
may never stop to consider that food and water are
included as well.
There is no indication in the Army policy that
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is an "all or
nothing" proposition. A patient or surrogate may,
therefore, request termination of the respirator, chemo-
therapy, hemodialysis, or other therapeutic measures but
retain nourishment. 114 Physicians recommending termi-
nation of treatment should explain in detail what treat-
ment is "life-sustaining" and should clearly explain the
various options. ",5 The time spent in explanation can
avoid tragic misunderstandings and prevent tremendous
emotional turmoil.
Documenting the Decision, its Basis,
and the Competency Determination
Both the DNR policy and the policy for withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment require documentation in the
patient's medical records. 116 The order itself must be
entered in the doctors orders. The progress notes must
include a discussion of the rationale for the order,
including a description of the patient's condition, the
mental status of the patient and the basis of any finding
of incompetency, the results of discussions with the
patient and family members, and any review by the
ethics panel. The importance of this requirement cannot
be overstated. Should the actions of the medical staff
ever be questioned, the best evidence of what was done
and why it was done will be the medical record. Short
cuts or incomplete recording will seriously hamper the
physicians' ability to justify their actions. On the other
hand, complete and accurate medical record entries will
demonstrate the good faith efforts of the medical staff
in following the prescribed policy. Judge advocates must
,o9 See, e.g., Childs v. Abramovice, No. A037920 (Nov. 30, 1988, Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (WESTLAW 1988 WL 127111); In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App.
3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); Bouvia V, Superior Coih, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d
368 (Fla. App. 1986); In re Gardner, 534 A,2d 947 (Me'I 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In
re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129
A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
11D Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment, Current Opinions of the Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association (1986), reprinted in 53 The Citation 51 (1986).
"' Of the jurisdictions with legislation dealing with the wltharawal of life-sustaining treatment, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all exclude
nutrition, fluids, nourishment, or sustenance from the definition of life-sustaining or life-prolonging medical treatment. See supra note 5.
1"2 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.1. 1988) ("Although an emotional symbolism attaches itself to artificial feeding, there is no
legal difference between a mechanical device that allows a person to breathe artificially and a mechanical device that artificially allows a person
nourishment."); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 373, 486 ,A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985) ("Analytically, artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or
intravenous infusion can been seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means when
the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on its own."); See also, Steinbrook and Lo, Artificial Feeding - Solid Ground, Not A
Slippery Slope, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 286 (1988).
"3 Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream, 14 Hastings Center Rep. 11 (1984), quoted in D. Meyers, Medico-Legal
Implications of Death and Dying § 12.27 (Supp. 1988). See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 958 (Me. 1987) (Clifford, J. dissenting) ("where food and
water are being provided in a non-invasive, pain-free manner to a non-terminally ill patient, the withdrawal of such a feeding tube for the purpose of
causing [the patient's] . . .death ignores the legitimate and longstanding interest of the state in preserving life and preventing suicide, exposes many
member of our society to potential abuse, and should not, be sanctioned"); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419, 432 (1987) (O'Hern, J.
dissenting) ("Any decision allowing one group of people to withhold food and water from another human being evokes a response deep beneath the
abstractions of legal reasoning."); Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 67, 83 (1988) ("Although it is true that artificial feeding
differs from normal eating, providing food and liquids is so psychologically bound to a level of expected non-medical care that physicians, not to
mention lay people, have difficulty in equating its removal with the removal of respirators and other less commonly provided forms of help."). See
also Correspondence, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 1754-59 (1988); Correspondence, 319 New Eng. J. Med. 306 (1988).
i4 In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 382 n. 11, 529 A.2d 419, 428 n.l I (1987) ("If a patient subjectively distinguishes among various forms of life support,
of course, that distinction will be respected.").
115 See Ruark and Raffin, Initiating and Withdrawing L(fe Support: Principles and Practice in Adult Medicine, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 25 (1986).
116 AR 40-3, para. 19-4; Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Letter, End., supra note 16 , para. 5.
APRIL 1989 THE ARMY LAWYER eDA PAM 27-50-196
HeinOnline  -- 1989 Army Law. 17 1989
impress upon the medical community the importance'of
both following the published policy and documenting
their actions in patients' medical records.
Conclusion
The Army policies concerning DNR orders and the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment are reasonable
attempts to balance competing interests. The interests at
stake, however, are profound, and no policy can satisfy
every interest'in all circumstances. Physicians, nurses,
lawyers, clergy, and family members all have a role to
play. The issues are not only medical or only legal; they
are medical, legal, ethical, spiritual, and philosophical.
Judge advocates, as members of the ethics committees
andas legal advisors to hospital commanders and their
staffs, must be prepared to accept their respongibilities.
They must, in cooperation with other interested parties,
ensure that patients' rights of self-determination and
privacy'-in medical treatment decisions are recognized
and respected. At the same time, they must weigh in the
balance society's interest in human life and medical
ethics. Only through Concern, compassion, and compe-
tency can the Army lawyer fulfill his or her responsibil-
ity in this difficult and sensitive area.
Source Selection-Litigation Issues During 1988
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Introduction
Few areas of contract formation cause as much
consternation as the source selection procedures in com-
petitive negotiated acquisitions. Unfortunately, the hun-
dreds of protests filed each year ifidicate that offerors
and government source selection officials do not fully
understand the procedures to be used. This article will
focus on the jurisdictional and substantive developments
in the source selection, process during 1988. This area of
government contract law remains dynamic and trouble-
some.
FAR Subpart 15.6 prescribes the policies and proce-
dures for the selection of a source or sources in
competitive negotiated acquisitions. As stated therein,
source selection procedures are designed to-
i. Maximize competition;
ii. Minimize -the complexity of the solicitation,
evaluation, and the selection decision;
iii. Ensure impartial and comprehensive evaluation
of offerors' proposals; and
iv. Ensure selection of the source whose proposal
has the highest degree of realism and whose per-
formance is expected to best meet stated Govern-
ment requirements.
Formal implementation of source selection policies
and procedures is the responsibility of agency heads or
their designees. 2 Regardless how that implementation
occurs, however, the role of the government contract
attorney in the source selection process is extensive and
pervasive. 3 The government contract attorney should be
an active participant in all stages of source selection, to
include: 1)' the review and even the drafting of the
solicitation and its evaluation criteria; 2) negotiations or,
discussions with offerors; 3) business and legal advice on
the award decision; and 4) the defense of the source
selection when protests arise.
Preparing the Request for Proposals
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) 4
requires that competitive proposals be evaluated solely
on the factors specified in the solicitation. s While
various contracting agencies follow different practices,
each recognizes the need for, detailed proposal evaluation
systems so that the source selection official can make a
sound decision. 6 Thus, a primary purpose of the Re-
quest for Proposals (RFP) is to provide the potential
offerors with an understanding of the way the, source
selection decision will be made. Fairness requires that the
basis for the source selection decision be stated in the
solicitation and that the decision be made in accordance
with those announced "rules of the game." 7
Describing the Evaluation Factors
In meeting this purpose, the various bid protest
forums have given agencies broad discretion in describ-
ing the source selection process to be used in 'an
acquisition. But while the evaluation factors that apply
Federal'Acquisition Regulation 15.603 [hereinafter FAR],
2 FAR 15.604(a).
3 See Army Material Command Pam 713-1, Source Selection Procedures (July 1987) [hereinafter AMC Pam 713-11.
4 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2356, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556, 40 U.S.C. § 759, and 41 U.S.C. §§ 252-254
(Supp. IV 1986)).
FAR 15.608(a).
See, e.g., Air Force Reg. 70-30, Streamlined Selection Procedures (31 Dec. 1986).'
7 FAR 15.605(e).
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